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Pope Benedict XVI and the Desideratum
of a Natural Law: Three Views
BY FATHER JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J., DAVID SOLOMON,- &
WILLIAM J. WAGNER..
Father James V. Schall, S.J.
Professor Kenneth Schmitz raises the question of whether there is anything to be
known in the history of any culture about moral truth, and, if there is, of how one goes
about discovering that knowledge.' His words lead me to consider the question of
natural law in relation to world history. The Holy Father, Pope Benedict, cites
common moral discourse as desideratum in his Regensburg Address. In that context,
he says that the historical intersection of the biblical faith with Greek philosophical
inquiry was an event of decisive importance, not merely from the standpoint of the
history of religion, but also from that of world history. 2 He asserts that this event is
still relevant today. The present collection of essays, gathered under the caption, A
Common Morality for the Global Age, assumes this contemporary relevance of the
Pope's question.
Pope Benedict XVI has, not just in his Regensburg Address, but more generally,
has set an agenda for uncovering the basis of common discourse on the most profound
level, about the meaning of our life in this world. The Catholic Church in the modem
era, in a certain sense, has been insufficiently engaged on this question, as measured
by a proportionate regard for its own further flourishing in the world at large. The
need for the church to address the issue is evident in its decline, in many ways, at least
in the West. The foundation of the Pope's agenda and the present collection of essays
is the need for a basis on which everyone in the world can, should, and must meet on
a common inquiry into what we are about as human beings. I concur with those
commentators who consider the Pope, at this moment and for this reason, to be the
most important voice in the world. The Pope's agenda is helpful in its posing the
question of the place of divine revelation in answering present need.
+ Professor of Government, Georgetown University.
"' Associate Professor of Philosophy and W.P. and H.B. White Director of the Center for Ethics and
Culture, University of Notre Dame.
+-' Professor of Law and Director of the Center of Law, Philosophy and Culture, The Catholic University
of America.
1 Kenneth Schmitz, Human Nature and Human Culture, post, pp. 87-99.
2 Pope Pope Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections (Sept. 12, 2006),
[hereinafter Regensburg Address], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/speeches
/2006/september/documentsfhf ben-xvi-spe_20060912 university-regensburg__en.html#top.
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In his article below, Kenneth Schmitz reminds us precisely that it makes sense to
ask the questions: First, am I able to know?; Second, what is there to be known?;
Third, where there is something to know, what is my responsibility to know it? The
remarkable part of Professor Schmitz's argument is its treatment of the implications
for the thing that we know by virtue of our knowing it. Now, I believe that Plato
originally set the stage for this question. Plato asks in the Symposium whether the
world is complete just by having been created and being present, or whether
something must occur in the world, which is not the responsibility of the creator or
the maker or whatever one terms the world's first cause, for the world to be
completed.3 And Plato said yes. Things need to be known in themselves, but they
also need to be known in relation to their role as the source of the direction of our
actions necessary if the world is to be completed. Kenneth Schmitz's point is parallel
to Plato's. The point is a very, very important one.
Pope Benedict says in his Regensburg Lecture, and elsewhere, that the modem
scientific understanding of the world-which, as far as it goes, he respects-in a
certain sense does not speak to the things most people consider important. The world
religions, on the other hand, do talk about these things. The intriguing subtitle of
Catherine Pickstock's recent book, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of
Philosophy,4 reflects what I believe is, in fact, the Pope's intention-i.e. a completion
of philosophy through a kind of liturgy. His agenda, in the area of inter-religious and
inter-culture dialogue, is precisely to make natural law and a common morality a
foundation for talking to one another about the things people actually consider
important.
The Pope holds that there is-as Kenneth Schmitz argues-such a thing as a reality
and a foundation of reality. Discovering how we come to understand this reality is
the objective to which the Pope is pointing us. As he does so, he is moving rather
rapidly to propose avenues for overcoming a kind of stalemate in a Christianity that
never, for that matter, has been a problem anywhere but in the Christian West and its
offshoot of secularity. I would not dispute the Pope's sense of timing in pressing his
agenda. I believe, moreover, that he is correct in asserting the key importance of both
of these elements to world history: (1) Greek philosophy; and (2) revelation, in so far
as revelation itself reflects an impulse to relate to reality.
David Solomon
The lovely subtitle of the present essays, In Gratitude for What We Are Given, could
be misleading. Professor Kenneth Schmitz, in his essay that follows, reasons in a
manner that reflects the natural-law tradition, but, as far as I can tell, there are only
three people left in the world who resemble Kenneth Schmitz; and they are all sort of
shaky right now. Therefore, the subtitle of this collection might better have been, "In
3 PLATO, TIMAEUS 16-18 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 2008).
4 CATHERINE PICKSTOCK, AFTER WRITING: ON THE LITURGICAL CONSUMMATION OF PHILOSOPHY
(1998).
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Sorrow for What We Have Lost." That is the real subtext as I read the situation of
any discussion of natural law. My comment on the topic of Pope Benedict XVI and
the Desideratum of a Natural Law will revolve around the greater aptness of this
theme, "In Sorrow for What We Have Lost."
Kenneth Schmitz gives us a picture of what can be considered the natural law
"from the inside out," setting out intellectual resources from which we can work. But,
the reception of Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address gives us an account of the
natural law that I think functions from "the outside in." 5 That reception points to why
we are in deep trouble. It is not, I think an accident, that Pope Benedict began his
Regensburg Address with those nostalgic comments about the "good old days" at the
University of Regensburg, 6 idealized and somewhat sentimentalized, where
everybody got along and talked about the big questions and the atheists came to talk
with everybody else. There was at that time patience in intellectual discussions and a
kind of hopefulness about the future. There was an absence of the specialization
affecting those of us gathered at universities today. There was not the pressure in
hiring to meet the standards of the best departments in the world. The Pope's address
begins with this nostalgia. It then offers its wonderfully compressed and brilliant
account of this sort of compact combination of Greek rationalism and Christian faith
that came together and sustained us for a millennium and a half, before the shock of
successive waves of an assault on the notion of reason-the Pope mentions three such
waves-that have made this synthesis come undone so that, even within Christian
theology, the "unreasonable" has been thought to be a guide for Christians and an
articulation of the heart of gospel faith. A kind of violence has come to be
experienced that we now encounter more or less daily in our lives. This violence is
not just a sort of physical violence, but includes various kinds of intellectual violence
in past centuries, unthinkable at the heart of the reflective lives of Christians. We are
in this deep problem, whether we like it or not. The assaults on reason pervading our
milieu have made it difficult for us to recover and sustain the kind of balance the Pope
calls to mind with nostalgia.
Now, the Regensburg Address invites reflection on its content. This lecture was
one, if there ever was one, calling for a reasonable exchange of views for its own
sake. But what response did the lecture elicit? The tenor of the press coverage was
cynical: "What's this guy really up to?"; "Who's he really after?"; "What's he... ?" I
believe that this cynicism indicated, root and branch, a complete lack of
comprehension of what he meant to address. I submit that the response to the lecture
was a kind of resort to violence. It was actually the best confirmation of Pope
Benedict's claims about the tendency within the culture-i.e., an inclination to
unreasoned response. I trust that the Pope took no comfort in this validation of his
thesis.
Questions remain on the table, setting aside nostalgia: Where do we turn to muster
5 Regensburg Address, supra note 1
6 Id. at 6.
SPRING 2009
Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture
the reasonable response Benedict tried to elicit?; How do we make sense of the loss to
which the Regensburg Address directs our attention, the loss of reason in certain
dimensions of our lives? In some ways, Pope Benedict's mistake in that talk was to
try to articulate the sorrow and this loss in the idiom of rational argumentation. It
should not be surprising that reasonable argument will likely fail as response to a
certain pathology of modem reason. One might suppose that a collection of papers
like the present one, generated as it has been at a university, would be a context for a
reasonable response to pathologies of reason. However, given the character of the
contemporary American university's environment, I must say that I had reason to
doubt, when asked to contribute to the present collection-arising as it has in just that
environment-whether it would present an occasion for meaningfully considering
what the Pope was saying. I can only assume that The Catholic University of
America, as a university in the United States, unavoidably suffers, to some degree-
as does the University of Notre Dame from whence I come-the general current
malaise of other universities in the American setting.
Unfortunately, the modem university is sick. So much of the reception given to the
Regensburg Address was devoted to ferreting out who the Pope was-one may
assume that the real concern was to defend an idea of the university that was, in fact,
incompatible with the Pope's vision. The Pope's critics imply that he was really "out
to get the university" or their view of it. He was out to get all of us, "the enemy." I
say: if the shoe fits, wear it. The enemy is, in truth, the modem university; it is
impossible-whether the present collection of essays is or is not an exception, the
reader can decide-to raise those questions that the Pope says have to be raised, if,
"from the outside in," we are going to recover a culture that can take natural law
seriously.
Even equipped with all the intellectual resources in the world of the kind
exemplified by Kenneth Schmitz's beautiful essay, we are lost if we do not have a
setting in which this conversation can be conducted. Moral philosophy, as my
colleague Alasdair Maclntyre always says, presupposes a sociology.7  It also
presupposes a psychology. 8 The sociology of the modem moral philosophy, which
rejects the very rudiments of natural law, is the very sociology of the modem research
university. Those of us, who teach in the philosophy and theology departments of
universities, aspiring to be the great Catholic universities of our day, know how
difficult it is on our campuses even to raise the kinds of questions summarily
described under the heading of "the desideratum of a natural law."
The lesson of the Regensburg Address is that the pathology of reason is the
pathology of the modem university. And the lesson that all of us, who teach at the
university, should take away from that address is less its reminder of the goal that
should inspire us and more the sense of loss that will be effected if we fail-and even
the loss we have already suffered through our failure to this point and how far we
7 MARKL C. MURPHY, ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 115 (2003).
8 Id.
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have already fallen. I wish that I could join in feeling the gratitude mentioned in the
subtitle that I mentioned at the outset, but I opt out of that because, under the present
circumstances, I believe the more promising beginning is reflection on our sorrow-
not our despair-as a necessary step in moving towards a day that we may greet with
gratitude.
William J. Wagner
Clearly for Pope Benedict XVI something like respect for natural law is a goal, but it
is so only in one sense and not in another. He sets out knowledge of the natural law
as a goal with appropriate qualification, sic et non, or yes and no.9 On the one hand, it
is clear that the Pope wishes to affirm reason as reliably mediating the basic
requirements of acting in conformity with the dignity of being human and the
emergence of the true human community. And, I believe, he holds that if reason is
given that role, one can expect a comprehensive and inclusive appreciation to come
into view of the full range of human rights, and we can expect to begin to join in
solidarity with others in appreciation for their initiatives and a deeper desire to
cooperate with them. And it is also true that Pope Benedict sees in this-call it
natural law-reasoning an alternative to a postulate that currently seems to reign: that
precisely a departure from these common assumptions would guarantee our peaceful
coexistence as peoples. And his remarks can be understood as a sound of alarm
regarding the negative implications of the "dictatorship of relativism" for human
happiness, giving rise, as it does, to only untrammeled selfish or, in any event,
isolating fragmentation.'
0
But, on the other hand, if one looks at Pope Benedict's writings, one finds no
endorsement of perfectionism. One searches in vain for any kind of prescriptions
about appropriate social structures. His viewpoint far more closely approximates
Western liberalism than it does Islamic revival, notwithstanding the monotheism that
links him with Islam and separates him from typical liberalism. One finds our Pope
cautioning those of us in the church that Catholic Social Thought does not give us a
basis for prescribing economics." One finds him carefully clearing away false
metaphysics, with his emphasis on freedom liberated from pseudo-cognitive limits.12
Reason, being underdetermined, is a preamble to politics, understood as an exercise in
freedom. His emphasis is on letting each generation "make them [i.e. politics] his
own" and on community in open discourse in the present towards a specification of
the structures it wants.
13
Now, I think it is fair to say Pope Benedict is an Augustinian. I doubt many people
would dispute that. And like Augustine, Pope Benedict emphasizes the freedom of
9 PETER ABELARD, SIC ET NON: A CRITICAL EDITION (Blanche B. Boyer & Richard McKeon eds., 1976).
10 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Homily on the Dictatorship of Relativism (April 18, 2005).
11 POPE BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST [ON CHRISTIAN LOvE] 29 (2005) [hereinafter DEUS
CARITAS EST].
12 Id. at 5.
13 Id. at 7.
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God and the freedom of human beings. Augustine, I think it is fair to say, is at the
root not merely of Pope Benedict's theology, but of social contract thought and
modem liberalism itself. Augustine makes a kind of bifurcation. There are the first
principles that ought to govern, then there is the reality of selfishness that conflicts
even with self-interest and a need, nonetheless, for a temporal peace, a tranquility
premised on a realistic assessment of the dynamics of self-interest and conflict. 14 In
this view, the seventeenth-century wars of religion were the fallout of a certain facile
ambition in the medieval synthesis, and the Peace of Westphalia became a godsend,
made possible by a retrieval of St. Augustine.
Moreover, where Pope Benedict does part ways with liberalism, he finds its error,
in germinal form, in Augustine himself. Pope Benedict is not simply an Augustinian;
he is an Augustinian with a difference. He rejects the Manichaeism that is still latent
in Augustine. He does not see sin as the reason for the provisional nature of our
temporal accord. Rather, he develops a properly theological basis-rather than one
rooted in a derivative theodicy-for the very principles of pluralism that organize
western liberal societies. 15  He endorses the neutrality and instrumentalism that
accompany positivism--even, in a meaningful sense, secularity--on theological
grounds.' 6 He is interested in clearing away barriers to freedom and to free political
creative exchange. He shows influence of the Frankfurt School. In Deus Caritas Est,
his encyclical, he emphasizes the importance of negative critique, clearing away, as
he does so, precisely unsustainable metaphysics of nineteenth century German idealist
philosophers and of Marxism itself, which give us a false sense of an "apriority." 9
And, likewise, on this basis I think it is fair to conclude that he rejects the
perfectionism even of ancient philosophers. He does so in favor of a kind of, I would
call it, liberalism that he develops on a theological foundation. I believe that Pope
Benedict's theology is not based on sin-notwithstanding my own inclination to
believe that the theodicy in Augustine deserves more continuing play-but on the
limits of reason, so that reason is essential to, but also limited in, what it can do for us.
In Pope Benedict's view, our desire outstrips what reason can teach us exactly. Now,
Pope Benedict, like St. Augustine, views the first principles of natural law as
absolutely directing our own judgment about the rectitude of the way things are going
here below and by what could be called analogy to the judgment that the Lord our
God will reach at the end of time about how we have all done. But both Pope
Benedict and Augustine assume that in the ordering of civil society, these first
principles of the natural law are going to be brought in only on a qualified basis, with
pragmatic concerns also entering the picture. Pope Benedict, for his part, where he
does view first principles of reason as essential, grounds them in God's love for us.
As he says, "God loved us first."'17 And on that basis, in gratitude, we can hope to
14 See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 54 (Marcus Dods trans., 1878) ("[the city of man] desires early
peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods and it makes war to attain this peace.").
DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 11, at 28.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 17.
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organize our lives according to these transcendent principles that are bestowed upon
us as a matter of our creation. But Pope Benedict would also say that "God loves us
last."
Pope Benedict emphasizes the last judgment and what God will have to say at the
end of time. What we are able to determine in our political assemblies is naught but a
drop in the bucket compared to what needs-if one is truly committed without
exception to the principles of human dignity and human moral accountability-to be
said in justice about how things are going here on Earth. t8 Nonetheless, Pope
Benedict provides a theology that permits Christians to join in modem secular society
and its contingent political decision-making and lawmaking, with knowledge that
doing so is worthwhile and that the meaning of doing so is not merely provisional
because of the intrusion of sin, pace Augustine. He also asserts that the justification
of the political order is not limited to self-interest, and this is where he says modem
liberalism is wrong. He holds instead that it is premised on a notion of reason, which
is per se social and communitarian but which, in humility, is orientated to what can be
done here and now temporally. Now, here is where the sorrow enters. To play on an
elision of Greek and Christian categories as Matthew Arnold proposed in his poem
Dover Beach, the sound of this sorrow heard now in Christian ears is a "sound
Sophocles long ago/Heard it on the Aegean, and it brought/Into his mind the turbid
ebb and flow/Of human misery."
1 9
The Christian sorrow, for Pope Benedict, is not the product of sin or apostasy. It is
the sorrow of Sophocles merely understood with theological depth acquired with
Christianity. The modest good that human reason can conceive and politics can attain
is only a tiny part of the good toward which our wills are oriented, which is the good
that is commensurate by the help of grace with God and outstripping our merely
human capabilities. Our dignity is much larger than what we can name or attain. And
so, then, with the Psalmist, we place ourselves before God, as Pope Benedict invites
us to see it, yes in gratitude and, of course, in praise, but also, let us not forget, in
lamentation. 20 Because there is a sadness, the sadness is not just a recent disorder in
society or the academy, as true and worrisome as I think Professor David Solomon, in
his own comment, justly suggests such disorder now is. At its root, the sadness that
we feel is a sadness inherent in our human finitude. We are not God. We can see and
know losses that we can do nothing to remedy. In this very shortfall, the psalmist
reminds us that we are called in faith to share our sorrow with a God who hears our
cry and ultimately responds in love.
21
18 Id. at 26-28.
19 MATTHEW ARNOLD, DOVER BEACH AND OTHER POEMS: UNABRIDGED 86 (1994).
20 MITCHELL DAHOOD, ANCHOR BIBLE: PSALMS 1-50, Psalm 34 (1995) (naming lamentation along with
praise and thanksgiving as central themes in the psalms).
21 Psalm 34:6 ("This poor man cried, and the Lord heard him: and saved him out of all his troubles.");
see also CLAUS WESTERMANN, PRAISE AND LAMENT IN THE PSALMS 11 (Richard N. Soulen & Keith Crim
trans., 1981) (explaining "praise and lament belong together as expressions of the human existence before
God").
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